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
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IT IS WELL

THE TREATIES of peace negotiated by President Harding between this country and Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the first signed in Berlin August 25, and ratified with overwhelming majorities by both branches of the German Government, passed the United States Senate October 18, sixty-six voting for the German treaty, twenty against. Austria has ratified the treaty, and Hungary will do the same upon the opening of her parliament, about November 1. When ratifications have been exchanged and the treaties proclaimed, there remain only the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of consular relationships to place the United States and her former enemies upon their pre-war footing of friendly intercourse. Whatever objections have been or may be raised to the terms of the treaties, we feel that the end will amply justify the means. The economic, political, and moral condition of the world is chaotic and distressing. One necessary step toward recovery from this situation is the return to amicable trade and political relations between the United States and the Central Powers. These treaties will make that more nearly possible.

It has been difficult to follow the opposition to the treaties. The charge that they are unintelligible in themselves is, we believe, a lawyer's quibble. If it were true that they mean an appointment by the United States of a representative upon the Reparations Commission, and therefore a fatal step into the whirlpool of the Treaty of Versailles, we could quite understand and, indeed, appreciate the opposition of such men as Mr. Borah. The fact, however, is that if the United States should appoint a member upon the Reparations Commission it could be done only with the advice and consent of the Congress. Surely, the Congress ought to be able to trust itself. We do not take the view that the United States, under the terms of the present treaties, is trying to "grab" anything. It is unmistakably a fact that the United States has certain claims against Germany, some of them pre-war claims and some of them claims arising from events transpiring during the war. It is proper that the United States should keep itself in position to present these claims at the proper time and in the proper way. It is no criticism of the treaties that they do not cover all possible contingencies that may arise in the future relations between this country and Europe. Neither are we of the opinion that the Woodrow Wilson Democracy of New York City is rendering any service to right thinking in America by harking back to views expressed a year or more ago by men faced with the problem of drawing political platforms in Chicago or San Francisco. Time does make ancient good uncouth, and the necessity for action sometimes makes

the fear of inconsistency itself an evil. The treaties just passed end the technical war, avoid embarrassing concessions, exclude the Covenant of the League of Nations, and lead toward normal relations between the United States and her former enemies. They do no violence to the traditional policies of this government and involve us not at all in that seething cauldron of interminable broils peculiar to Europe. It is well that the treaties are an accomplished fact.



LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE OLD NOSTRUM

"I've taken a lot of that medicine without getting rid of my troubles."—*Brown in the Chicago Daily News.*

HOW THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS MAY LESSEN THE CHANCES OF WAR

THE WORLD is beginning to see the gray break of the morning after the night before. It has had a wild experience, expensive withal. As they come to their senses and feel of their pocket-books, the nations discover that they are both sick and bankrupt, their pockets empty, their debts staggering, and their jobs gone. The night of drunkenness, lasting through seven long years, has left them ill indeed and sore distressed.

Sobering up, they inquire about the things that must be done. The one least injured by the wild debauch, namely, the United States of America, has shown the way. It has spoken the sane word. To the ones most vitally concerned it has said two things, namely: We must reduce our expenses; we must sign the pledge. Surely that sounds like good advice.

The nations must retrench. This is a patent fact, apparent to all. The debts must be paid, current expenses must be met, a sinking fund must be provided for the reconstructions and new enterprises. Since this is so, the unproductive and unnecessary expenses must be pared to the bone and that right early. The unproductive and unnecessary expenses constitute at present the major part of the total. Thus the leading nations of the world are expressing openly their faith in the possibility of a general reduction of armaments, if not, indeed, of a veritable disarmament, as the means of economic salvation.

Colonel Georges Noblemaire, of France, President of the Paris, Lyons and Mediterranean Railroad, speaking in Geneva, and with the full approval of the French Government, on October 1, insisted that France hates war for the reason that no nation had so suffered from it; and went on to say: "What does France ask for? First of all, for complete disarmament of the States which were obliged to disarm in accordance with treaties. Secondly, organization of the right of investigation, which is an indispensable condition to disarmament action. Given those conditions, France is ready for a scheme of practical disarmament." Upon the same day and in the same place, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, of England, said: "Gentlemen, M. Noblemaire has said the policy of France is peace. That, too, is the policy of Great Britain." Captain Bruce, of Australia, also said on the same occasion: "We want to see the nations disarm because without a great navy and army nobody can take Australia from us." And Mr. Branting, of Sweden, also upon the same occasion, said that he saw hope in regional disarmament, adding that some nations were ready now to make such bargains with their neighbors. "What Sweden wants," said Mr. Branting, "is to get beyond the era of vague phrases and down to realities on this disarmament business." Such statements spring from a great fear, a realizing sense of the financial ruin facing the great nations because of the costs of war. This fear is justified by the facts. That practically all of the nations, outside the United States and Japan, are insolvent, if we look upon them from the point of view of the value of their matured obligations as of July last, is apparent from the following table:

Country.	Par.	Exchange rates.	Per cent of solvency.
Austria	\$.2030	\$.0015	00.70
Belgium1930	.0778	40.30
Czechoslovakia2030	.0134	06.60
Denmark2680	.1650	61.60
England	4.86½	3.6975	76.00
Finland1930	.0170	08.80
France1930	.0793	41.10

Germany2390	.0133	05.60
Greece1930	.0577	29.90
Holland4020	.3254	80.90
Hungary2030	.0038	01.80
Italy1930	.0474	24.60
Jugo-Slavia2030	.0067	03.00
Norway2680	.1395	52.10
Poland2380	.0006	00.25
Rumania1930	.0148	07.60
Russia5140	.0020	00.39
Serbia1930	.0272	14.10
Spain1930	.1280	66.40
Sweden2680	.2162	80.70
Switzerland1930	.1676	86.80
India4866	.2400	49.30
Japan4980	.4800	96.40
Argentina4244	.2962	69.80
Brazil3245	.1050	32.40
Canada	1.0000	.8790	87.90

Measured by the value of her matured obligations, Japan can show only 96.4 per cent of solvency. The United States is little better off.

Of course, this distressing economic situation has been brought about wholly by the war, the costs of which are staggering. Take the costs to the United States alone. Mr. Frederick A. Dolph is authority for the following table, submitted by Senator Spencer and printed in the *Congressional Record* July 6, 1921:

United States World War Costs

(Revised from data made public up to July 1, 1921.)

Military cost, as per report of Secretary Houston	\$24,010,000,000.00
Extra cost of government functions under war conditions, as per report of Secretary Houston.....	4,500,000,000.00
Red Cross contributions.....	978,512,225.00
Other relief contributions to organizations—Salvation Army, Knights of Columbus, Y. M. C. A., etc., estimated at one-half Red Cross.....	490,000,000.00
Governmental contributions to relief from war supplies, etc. (See <i>Congressional Record</i> , June 24, 1921, p. 3181).....	648,000,000.00
American citizen claims against Germany, as per report of Secretary of State. (See S. Doc. No. 419, 66th Cong., 3d sess.).....	221,133,231.21
Confiscated American-owned property in Germany, as per same document.....	191,147,346.76
Confiscated property of American prisoners in Germany, as per same document	12,560.08
Pension costs, estimated by comparison with Civil War pensions. Wounded in Civil War were 246,712 and in World War 224,089. Civil War pensions up to June 30, 1919, were \$5,299,859,509.39. (See <i>Congressional Record</i> , June 20, 1921, p. 2908).....	5,000,000,000.00

Obligations of foreign governments absorbed in the United States by private interests since August 1, 1914. (See report of Secretary Glass in <i>Congressional Record</i> , June 24, 1921, p. 3181) . . .	4,129,820,344.11
Governmental loans to allies, with interest	10,000,000,000.00
Total	50,168,625,707.16

Look at it from another point of view. We may have called the attention of our readers to these facts before, but no apology is necessary for repeating them here. We now know that the United States Government appropriated for the year ending June 30, 1920, \$5,686,005,706. We know that 25 per cent of this was appropriated for present armaments, 67.8 per cent for past wars, including the care of soldiers, pensions, railroad deficit, shipping board, interest on the public debt, European relief, and the like—a total of 92.8 per cent. This left 3.2 per cent for the administration of the government, including the expenses of the Congress, the President, and the various departments; 3 per cent to be expended upon public works, such as harbors, rivers, roads, and parks, and 1 per cent for the promotion of our agricultural and natural resources, the interest of labor, education, and public health. Putting these facts in other words, the taxation for the Federal Government for the year given averaged \$50 per person—men, women, and children. Out of each \$50 the amount spent for research, education, and development, was fifty cents.

Manifestly, the United States of America, albeit the wealthiest of the nations, the creditor nation of the world, must revise its budget as a mere matter of common sense. If that be so for the United States, how much more must it be true of all the other armament-laden nations. The Washington conference will have the impetus of a world-wide desire to reduce military expenses as the great essential step toward anything like a condition of economic sanity.

But suppose armaments are reduced and these wild expenditures are, in fact, lessened. Will the world be any safer as a place in which to live? Will the economic relief promote the cause of peace and justice between nations? Not to speak of.

Manifestly, armaments are of no significance except as the agencies of policy. Armaments in and of themselves are impotent. It is the motives behind them that cause and wage wars. If all of the nations were to scrap their armaments tomorrow, retaining at the same time their greeds and hates and intrigues, the world would be no less dangerous as a dwelling-place for man. Some unknown chemist in Berlin, Oshkosh, or Kamchatka might tomorrow perfect an instrument of destruction which, for the nominal expense of \$3.00, might blow

London or Paris or New York into unrecoverable bits in five minutes of time. Given the motive for such business, some such result is the omnipresent dread. Where fears exist hatreds thrive. Where there are hatreds, instruments of destruction will be found, and, hence, war will continue to lift its threatening fist. Thus the reduction of armaments or, for that matter, the abolition of armaments, aside from the economic advantage, would be of no benefit to a world that knows war to be the most perfect expression of all that is evil. Any effective reduction of armaments must, therefore, begin with a reduction in terms of policy. We must sober up.

The most fundamental problem, therefore, facing the coming conference for the reduction of armaments is this problem of international policy. To be specific, can Japan be persuaded to change her policy toward Korea and China? Can European nations be persuaded to change their policies toward China? Or will the United States change its policy toward Japan or the European States now in China? Thus the problem even of reducing armaments is a difficult problem, probably the most difficult problem facing the world.

It is evident that the United States government has been mindful of the difficulties. It has consistently attempted to define and to narrow the scope of the conference, evidently with the hope of thus attaining some definite and desirable result. There has been a steady pressure from this government in all directions to keep the subjects to be discussed within the limits originally contemplated, namely, the reduction of armaments and attention to the Pacific problems. Hence, thus far, the unwillingness of both President Harding and Secretary Hughes to regard the debts owed by other nations to this government as in any sense an appropriate part of the business to be considered. Other attempts to enlarge the program have been frowned upon by the United States.

It is true that this government did not accept the Borah plan of limiting the discussions to matters relating to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. It has seen fit to include France and Italy, and, for matters with which they are directly concerned, China, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal; but the American opinion seems to be that the conference should concentrate upon a few things that press particularly for attention, and that it should feel its way carefully as to other matters. The tentative agenda prepared by the State Department, and apparently agreeable in the main to the other nations that will participate in the conference, as phrased by the State Department itself, are as follows.

CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

Out of courtesy to the united governments, the State Department did not give out the tentative suggestions as to the agenda for the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments.

Inasmuch as information as to the list of topics has been received from sources other than the department and the publication is inaccurate in some particulars, a corrected statement is appended.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

1. Limitation of naval armament, under which shall be discussed (a) basis of limitation, (b) extent, (c) fulfillment.
2. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
3. Limitation of land armament.

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS

1. Questions relating to China.

First. Principles to be applied; second, application.

Subjects:

- (a) Territorial integrity.
- (b) Administrative integrity.
- (c) Open door—equality of commercial and industrial opportunity.
- (d) Concessions, monopolies, or preferential economic privileges.
- (e) Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railway.
- (f) Preferential railroad rates.
- (g) Status of existing commitments.

2. Siberia. (Similar headings.)

3. Mandated islands. (Unless questions earlier settled.)

Under the heading of "Status of Existing Commitments," it is expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of rights may hereafter be asserted.

Surely, here is enough for one conference. To start out to accomplish more would do more harm than good. The administration in Washington has evidently entertained the hope that certain specific Far Eastern questions, such as those arising out of the Yap and Shantung disputes, may be settled before the conference convenes. There are some indications that the efforts toward adjusting the Yap dispute have progressed satisfactorily; but, on the surface at least, there seems to be more skepticism about Shantung. China has rejected the proposals which Japan made in September, proposals which seemed to intimate that they were Japan's last word in the premises. It may be that China is disposed to hold back as to Shantung and lay the question before the conference, on the theory that she cannot get less in Washington than Japan has already offered, and that she may possibly get more. In any event, the point to be kept clearly in mind is that the Washington conference will succeed or fail in proportion as it meets and solves, to the satisfaction of the parties concerned, certain outstanding problems of policy.

Thus the conference will be faced with most delicate situations. Much of the work will have to be done with great scientific skill. There will be international surgical operations far more delicate in their nature and far

more important to the welfare of the world than have ever been attempted in the realm of ordinary surgery. The patient—in this case the world—is desperately ill. We have assigned our best surgeons to the case. The other members of our family—England, France, Japan, Italy—have done the same. It is proper for us to let our surgeons know the depth of our feelings; but the specific work is to be done by these men chosen for the purpose.

It is proper for the American Federation of Labor to organize nation-wide demonstrations, beginning on Armistice Day, when the conference will meet, and to solicit the co-operation of civic, educational, and religious bodies. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America is now probably rendering a service by appealing to 150,000 congregations, calling upon the Christian forces to mobilize their strength to the end that the conference may be led to a reduction of armaments that will be sweeping in scope. Meetings and educational efforts may and should render a service. Like all figures of speech, our reference to the conference as an operation in surgery does not stand on all fours. Hope in the situation lies in the fact that the nations, so desperate is their plight, will be willing to modify very materially their international policies. In any event, the one outstanding fact is that the reduction of armaments will have no relation to the peace of the world except it begin with a modification in terms of policy. It must have been a realization of this that led Walter Williams, president of the Press Congress of the world, to say in his annual address at the conference in Honolulu, October 12, that what is needed is to "disarm the typewriters of the jingo press of the world"; that then the limitation of armaments would become a reality. Indeed, he went on to suggest a "League of Journalists" dedicated to the ending of secret diplomacy and imperialism and which would devote itself to justice and fair play.

True, aside from the questions of policy, the difficulties involved in the problem of reducing armaments are, as we have said, very great. Shall the reduction be in terms of submarines, air-craft, or poisons, and upon what principle? Naval men are not able to tell us the relative strength of submarines to a battleship. The status of the air-machine has not been ascertained. Chemistry is a terrifying but undefined factor. Distances and geographical position bear a very direct relation to the importance of submarines, gases, and battleships. But what that relation is is more than exact science can tell us. Should the conference confine itself exclusively to the reduction of the armaments upon the sea, or should it concern itself also with the reduction of armies? If it goes into the limitation of land armaments, according to its program, it will soon meet the demand on the

part of France that she be protected along the Rhine, a very visible stumbling-block confronting any conference concerned with the problem of land armaments. One is led to suppose that the United States Government considers the limitation of naval armaments as of more importance than the limitation of land armaments, for the reason that it places the former at the head of its agenda. But whether naval armaments or land armaments constitute a greater threat to the peace of the world is a matter that has not been discussed, so far as we know. There remains always the problem of keeping the seas free and open in time of war, a problem which England refused even to discuss in Paris. Will she discuss it here?

In the government's agenda questions of policy are put last. We feel sure that both Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes fully realize that questions of policy must come first, if any adequate result is to grow out of the proceedings. As we have tried to show, a reduction only in terms of money, except for the tax-payer, can be of little significance. We are confronted with a situation in morals.

Much as we are inclined to mistrust formulas, this conference must end in formulas mutually acceptable. French fears of Germany must be removed. The fears of Great Britain and the dominions with reference to the seas in time of war must be overcome. Provision for the increasing population of Japan must be made. For the decision of such matters formulas must be found, accepted, and lived up to. These are matters of international morals. We have already referred to the address by Colonel Noblemaire, of France. This soldier and business man said other things. We quote:

Gentlemen, I took part in the war. I saw men killed. I sent men to death when it was my duty. But there are beautiful things, even in war. Let me tell you of a young soldier, scarcely more than a child, who lay dying on a stretcher. When I asked him what was the last word I could take to his family, whom I knew, he said: "Tell mother for me, Long live France," and he died.

And such incidents took place on both sides. How many German heroes said, "Tell mother for me, Long live Germany." And why should not the hopes of those heroes—for both were heroes—be realized? Why cannot France and Germany live side by side in peace and prosperity? That is what the whole pacific and industrious French people desire.

But, peaceable as we are, we are not blind Pacifists. We will not be deaf to sounds of wars and dangers about us. Those Pacifists who would blindly strip their countries' defenses lead their people not to the millennium, but to the slaughter-house. France wants the reparations and security promised her in the peace treaty. But as yet we do not see security completed. Conditions now are better than they were yesterday, but we want them still better tomorrow.

German material disarmament is nearly completed, but the non-possibility of re-armament is no less essential. What is the use of destroying obsolete weapons if you leave the

opportunity to make more modern weapons? We want moral disarmament, and the world wants moral disarmament. Without that, material disarmament is a snare and delusion.

PASSPORTS AS A MEANS OF GRACE

THE STYLE in passports, unlike certain other styles, is set in Washington. One outstanding fact about these creations is that they cost just now \$10 in American money. Of course, this refers to only the bare bones of the things, naked and unadorned. When fully trimmed, the cost is sometimes staggering. Each adornment is liable to cost \$10 in itself. The prospective voyager gets the precious original, pays the equivalent of 1,250 marks, and, if he be but a beginner in the fine art of traveling, he is all unconscious of the fact that his troubles have just begun. The United States not only charges \$10 for the framework; it charges \$10 for each separate trimming, commonly called a visé. The other nations looking on, believing in the justice of the principle of reciprocity, raise their visés accordingly, with the result that traveling has become a luxury only for the rich. It is a fact that the cost of visés for a journey from Paris to Constantinople is greater than the cost of a second-class railroad ticket between the same points. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Interparliamentary Union, meeting at Stockholm, saw fit to pay its respects to this situation by passing a formal resolution looking toward a restraint in this special realm of profiteering. An American business man recently returning to Berlin from Riga complains that trade with the Baltic States and with Russia is "exceedingly difficult" because of the passport regulations. It appears that the American authorities insisted on his delivering his passport to them before entering Russia, while the Soviet Government insisted that all Americans, including him, in order to receive protection, can enter Russia only with passports. This looks strangely like what might be called an impasse. A gentleman failed first to get a visé for certain Baltic States; whereupon the American consul at Riga refused to give the gentleman a visé to return to Germany, the Germans the while insisting that Americans must be granted visés by the American consul. Once again an impasse. It is not wholly without reason that the Baltic States have retaliated against America's ten-dollar passport law by each of them demanding a ten-dollar visé for American passports. But it is none the less embarrassing for the traveler to pay a grand total of \$40 in passport millinery if he wishes to travel from Berlin to Riga. It is interesting that the Poles insist on a visé for their "free city" of Danzig.

And yet there is an advantage in the new style. It promotes self-discipline. If a man succeeds in traveling